Knowing what you want

http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2006_12.html

"Even so, the US does have the bad habit of being fickle with its friends in the Middle East. Many people in the March 14 bloc likewise are worried the US will abandon them to Hezbollah, the Iranians, and the Baath. Anti-American elements in March 14 will tell you that the reason they don’t trust America is not because they hate the US, but because Americans are unreliable allies who care only about themselves and not about Lebanon."

I tend to give the US the benefit of the doubt on many issues, because the historical record is replete with their consistent championing of the right people in the right places at the right time. However, my own (vastly less knowledgeable) take on the middle east is very much consistent with Michael Tottens. I'm not too sure how many US diplomats or politicians have ever bothered to find out what the historical dynamics are in the ME, and how normal in many respects the politics are there if you take the time to find out who really wants what. Unfortunately, you have many many people like ex-US President Carter, who went straight from deep ignorance to championing one party (out of many thousands of parties) in the complex tableaux of ME politics. This naivety and arbitrariness tends to make the many rational players in the ME despair of getting the US to make long-term commitments to the right people and the right ideas in the ME.

Saying that, even the British Empire, with many individuals with vastly more knowledge of the actual makeup and history of the ME, had a difficult time finding responsible and far-sighted organisations and leaders to ally to. They were also sold some serious lines, like the pan-Arab imperialist dreams of Hussein-Ibn-Ali, sharif of Mecca and his three sons Ali, Abdullah and Faisal in the early 2oth century. Vast territories were pretty much awarded to them on the basis of Arabist claims which turned out to be wholly bogus. But at least the British knew the major players, and quite often what their agendas were. I get the strong impression that many US officials, when confronted by the complexity and depth of ME affairs just can't be bothered to try to get a handle on why todays players are doing what they are doing. And the fact that many groups in the ME have amazingly bold and ambitious plans for themselves which are often woefully unrealistic adds yet another layer of instability to what is already a stressfully eclectic mix.

At various times, the US has championed nationalists against communists, Shahs against reformers, reformers against tribal leaders, pan-Arabists against nationalists and vice versa. Without having some view of what they eventually want (perhaps stable nations which evenly represent the patchwork makeup of the population?), the US is left with worthy but hollow invocations of things like democracy and freedom. The ME has always been a place of empires, where strong men with armies carved for themselves a new order over the bodies of whoever was silly enough to get in the way. The transition from that state of mind to one where men are content to live within their nations borders, and form a happy coalition of mutual aid and practical progress is under way, but is still some way off. In that respect (Japan, Germany, S Korea) the US has a very good track record of sticking with the transitional program. But the commitment to that process in Iraq (and Lebanon and Israel etc) must be steely and cognisant of the difficulty of breaking habits thousands of years in the making. An understanding of historical shifts and trends would be handy, and the teaching of the basics of ME history should become a part of US education.

Simply pursuing US interests in the most economic of senses is simply not enough. The imperialist habits of thought that permeate ME politics must be replaced by more humble and practical ones.