A strategy to prevail in the Middle East

http://www.steynonline.com/content/view/172/

I posted yesterday about the exercise of power. Further to my point,

"Whenever I bemoan the inconclusive end to the [1991] Gulf War, I receive letters from aggrieved veterans pointing out that they blew through Saddam’s much vaunted Republican Guard in nothing flat. That’s correct. But the reality – which Baudrillard appeared to grasp and the realpolitik realists didn’t – is that war isn’t a technical demonstration of superior power but about the willingness to use that power to achieve strategic ends. In that sense, the Gulf War did not take place."

Again, I have to disagree with Mark Steyn. As the Roman legions demonstrated on many occasions, war must be a 'technical demonstration of superior power' as well as the willingness to use that superior power in some achievable strategic cause. To what end did the vast 1991 coalition put its magnificent victories?

"If you stage a devastating bombs-away video game on CNN and at the end the bad guy is still standing, it’s not merely that “nothing has changed”. If Team USA achieves a scoreless draw against the South Sandwich Islands, by definition that’s a much better result for the latter than the former. In other words, the War That Did Not Place was perceived on the Arab street and beyond to have been won by Saddam. To be sure, an elaborate and expensive dictatorial management program was erected by the UN – Oil for Food, No-Fly Zones – but it proved to be a cash cow for him and ensured that the Americans and British spent the years before the 2003 war being berated by the Euroleft and the NGOs for wreaking ongoing humanitarian devastation on Iraq."

The battles won achieved nothing but the bizarre semi-neutering of Saddam- semi in the sense that to the southern Shia, the Marsh Arabs and the Kurds it must have felt like business as usual. A failure of vision and of knowledge by Colin Powell especially meant that in 2003 the US and Britain had to finish off a Saddam who had spent the intervening twelve years assiduously buying the complicity of the French, Germans, Russians and Chinese. No international coalition of any merit could be formed, with the lasting (false) impression that Britain and America were in it for their own strategic gain. If it were only true. Freeing the Iraqis has come at a very high price. Not particularly high in terms of military losses- all the casualties so far are much less than one days casualties in a World War One battle- but in worldwide distrust of America and Britain and the perception that they are agressive neo-colonialists. There is no easy way to dispel this misperception either, as far as I can see.

So what are the strategic goals of the US/British coalition now? Iraq must become not just a recovering basket-case but a beacon of stability, respect for human rights and economic success, along the lines of Germany and Japan post world war two. That will provide strong leverage not just against our ostensible opponents like Iran and Syria, but against the 'benign' despots of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Saudi Arabia needs many curatives- its toxic combination of economic stagnation, militant clericalism and completely locked down politics is a time-bomb. Egypt has a huge population which is gradually being radicalised while its political masters listlessly observe. Egypt will be a huge problem whether is has democracy or not- the Muslim Brotherhood are just waiting for the first genuine elections to turn the country into a Sharia dictatorship.

If Iraq can emerge as not just rich and well-run but secular, combined with Turkey they will represent a potent counter-example to all Middle-easterners that there is another path. And whisper it quietly, but if Iran is well-handled, it could become the first 21st century mullahocracy to shake off the Sharia vice-grip and resume modern life. The signs are manifold that the young population are utterly bored with living like 7th century desert-Arabs, and want something approximating the lifestyle available to us.

The strategic situation I have just described is not only achievable, but there must be quiet confidence in Washington and London that even with an average amount of luck, we can presume that this is how events will come to pass. There is a long way to go, but the path ahead seems clear.